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Abstract
In the standard version of conceptual metaphor theory,
metaphors are stable connected structures in the conceptual sys-
tem that emerge either because there is some similarity between
two domains of experience (resemblance-based metaphors) or
because the two domains are correlated in bodily experience
(correlation-based metaphors). I propose that in addition to
these two types of metaphor there is a third one, I call them
“context-induced” metaphors. These metaphors emerge from
the (immediate and less immediate) context in which conceptu-
alizers conceive of ideas in metaphorical ways.
I suggest that the context can have a priming effect on
(metaphorical) conceptualization. The effect of various kinds
of context on metaphorical conceptualization can take a variety
of forms, and several of them produce imagistic metaphors. The
kinds of contexts that can produce context-induced metaphors
include the following: (1) the immediate physical setting, (2)
what we know about the major entities participating in the dis-
course, (3) the immediate cultural context, (4) the immediate
social setting, and (5) the immediate linguistic context itself.
Of these, the context that most clearly produces visual
metaphors is the immediate physical setting. Various aspects
of the physical setting can prompt conceptualizers to select var-
ious (visual, auditory, etc.) images from the context as source
domains for their metaphorical targets. This process can be ei-
ther conscious or unconscious. In the paper, I discuss several
examples of imagistic metaphors of the visual kind.
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Images and image schemas
What kind of form does thought (that is, the combination of
concepts) have in an experientialist conceptual system? Most
cognitive linguists propose that thought is not based on propo-
sitions, which are strings of arbitrary symbols, similar to the
arbitrary character of the linguistic sign. Instead, thought in-
volves the use of highly abstract but experientially-based image
schemas [3–5,9, 11] . These are schematizations of some of our
most basic experiences that have to do with motion, space, vi-
sion, force, and so forth. In thought, they are combined to yield
complex structures for the conceptualization of the world, and
in metaphorical thought they are metaphorically projected onto
abstract domains of experience. By virtue of the fact that they
derive from basic human experience, image schemas bear an
analogical, rather than an arbitrary, relationship to what they are
used to conceptualize. In other words, the conceptualization of
the world in the experientialist model of the conceptual system
is imagistic, rather than propositional.
By definition, concepts in a perceptual, modal, or experien-
tialist, conceptual system must be embodied. In the cognitive
linguistic view, the embodiment of concepts arises in several
ways. First, concepts are based on image schemas that constitute
early preconceptual experiences and they are constantly rein-
forced in everyday life [5,9]. Such image schemas as container,
part-whole, source-path-goal, force and resistance to force, and
others underlie many of our concepts. For example, the con-
tainer image schema defines more specific concepts such as in,
out, and enter, the source-path-goal schema defines concepts
such as journey, arrive, travel, and leave, and the force schema
defines concepts such as push, pull, resist, and emotion. Sec-
ond, in many cases concepts are defined by properties that are
“interactional,” and not objectively inherent in entities (see, e.g.
[10, 12]). Such properties include sensory-motor activities, per-
ceptual shape and other qualities, relative size, function, goal,
and several additional ones. These are properties that emerge
from our interactions with objects.
Images are much less schematic than image schemas, in that
they contain rich details of what we perceive of the world in the
course of our interaction with it. The images we perceive in the
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various modalities of perception (visual, tactile, auditory, etc.)
are specific and fully-felt experiences in context. It is common-
place knowledge that of these images visual ones predominate.
As we build concepts for our experiences that contain such vi-
sual images, visual imagery becomes a part of many of our best
known metaphorical source domains. The concepts of building
(as in theories are buildings), fire (as in love is fire), war (as in
argument is war), machine (as in the mind is a machine), and
many others, all contain visual images. However, the present
paper does not deal with such visual images present in highly
conventional conceptual metaphors; instead, it attempts to ac-
count for the role visual images play in the creation of largely
novel metaphors in what I call “immediate physical contexts.”
For the purposes of the present paper, I also distinguish the
visual metaphors that arise from the immediate physical context
from the visual (commonly called “pictorial”) metaphors that
can be found in cartoons, films, advertisements, pictures, and
so on. This latter category of visual metaphors is studied inten-
sively by Charles Forceville (see, e.g., Forceville, 2006, 2008),
together with multimodal metaphors.
Visual images and local contexts
Metaphorical conceptualization is affected not only by the
global context (such as the general physical, social, cultural,
etc. environment) but also by more immediate local contexts
(see [7, 8] ). These include the immediate physical setting, the
knowledge about main entities in the discourse, the immediate
cultural context, the immediate social setting, and the immediate
linguistic context. Local and global contexts are assumed here
to form a continuum from the most immediate local contexts to
the most general global ones. I will first describe an example of
how the immediate physical context can affect the selection of
metaphors in an everyday situation, then I will analyze a more
complex case in the use of metaphor in psychological counsel-
ing, and finally I turn to an example from the use of metaphor
in poetry. In all of these cases, my goal will be to examine how
visual images can, and do, result in metaphors that range from
less novel to highly novel ones.
An everyday example
The immediate physical setting can influence the selection
and use of particular metaphors in discourse. The physical set-
ting comprises, among possibly other things, the physical events
and their consequences that make up or are part of the setting,
the various aspects of the physical environment, and the percep-
tual qualities that characterize the setting. I will briefly discuss
an example for the first. We can find examples for the latter
two in other studies (e.g. [1, 13] ), though their analyses are not
formulated in terms of the present framework.
Physical events and their consequences are well demonstrated
by a statement made by the American journalist who traveled to
New Orleans to do an interview with Fats Domino two years
after the devastation wreaked by hurricane Katrina, when the
city of New Orleans was still struggling with many of the con-
sequences of the hurricane. The journalist comments:
”The 2005 hurricane capsized Domino’s life, though he’s
loath to confess any inconvenience or misery outside of miss-
ing his social circle . . . ” (USA TODAY, 2007, September 21,
Section 6B).
The metaphorical statement “The 2005 hurricane capsized
Domino’s life” is based on the general metaphor life is a jour-
ney and its more specific version life is a sea journey. The
sea journey source domain is chosen probably because of the
role of the sea in the hurricane. More importantly, it should
be noted that the verb capsize is used (as opposed to, say, run
aground), though it is not a conventional linguistic manifes-
tation of either the general journey or the more specific sea
journey source domains. I suggest that this verb is selected
by the journalist as a result of the then (still) visible conse-
quences in New Orleans of the hurricane as a devastating phys-
ical event. The physical setting thus possibly triggers the exten-
sion of an existing conventional conceptual metaphor and causes
the speaker/conceptualizer to choose a metaphorical expression
that best fits that setting. We can think of this “triggering ef-
fect” as a form of priming that comes from the immediate local
context.
An example from counseling
The main entities participating in discourse include the
speaker (conceptualizer), the hearer (addressee/conceptualizer),
and the entity or process we talk about (topic). We can find
cases where the selection of a metaphor depends on knowledge
about the conceptualizer (speaker or hearer). To demonstrate
this, I take an example from my previous work [6] but rean-
alyze it here. What is especially intriguing about such cases
is that the speaker/author’s (conceptualizer’s) knowledge about
him- or herself does not need to be conscious. As one would
expect, one important source of such cases is the area of ther-
apy or psychological counseling. In a therapeutic context peo-
ple commonly create novel metaphors as a result of unique and
traumatic life experiences. The metaphors that are created un-
der these circumstances need not be consciously formed. The
example comes from an article in the magazine A & U (March,
2003) about photographic artist Frank Jump.
Frank Jump photographs old painted mural advertisements in
New York City. He has AIDS, but he has outlived his expected
life span. His life and his art are intimately connected metaphor-
ically. The conceptual metaphor operative here could be put
as follows: surviving aids despite predictions to the contrary is
for the old mural advertisements to survive their expected “life
span.” At first, Jump was not consciously aware that he works
within the frame of a conceptual metaphor that is based on his
condition. In his own words:
In the beginning, I didn’t make the connection between the
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subject matter and my own sero-positivity. I was asked to be part
of the Day Without Art exhibition a few years ago and didn’t
think I was worthy—other artists’ work was much more HIV-
specific. . . . But my mentor said, “Don’t you see the connec-
tion? You’re documenting something that was never intended
to live this long. You never intended to live this long.” [p. 27;
italics in the original]
The mentor made the conceptual metaphor conscious for the
artist. I believe something similar is happening in many cases of
psychotherapy and counseling. It could be argued that it is the
mentor who conceptualizes the situation for the artist. This may
be a possible interpretation, but, on the other hand, when Jump
says “In the beginning, I did not make the connection between
the subject matter and my own sero-positivity”, it is clear that
the connection is in his unconscious and readily available to him
as well.
Obviously, the metaphor surviving aids despite predictions
to the contrary is for the old mural advertisements to survive
their expected “life span” is anything but a conventional con-
ceptual metaphor. The metaphor is created by Frank Jump as a
novel analogy – the unconscious but nevertheless real analogy
between surviving one’s expected life span as a person who has
AIDS and the survival of the mural advertisements that were
created to be visible on the walls of buildings in New York City
for only a limited amount of time. In this case, (unconscious)
self-knowledge leads the conceptualizer to find the appropri-
ate analogy. The analogy is appropriate because the source
and the target domains share schematic structural resemblance;
namely, an entity existing longer than expected. The resulting
metaphor(ical analogy) is novel and creative and it comes about
as a result of what the conceptualizer knows about himself.
But we can ask how the creation of the metaphor actually
takes place. We can assume that as Jump wanders around the
city looking for mural advertisements and notices one, a frame
for such advertisements is activated in his head. The frame con-
tains the various properties of mural advertisements. There is
also a huge amount of background knowledge associated with
the frame. What gets highlighted, or profiled, from all of this
knowledge is the intended future, the destiny of the advertise-
ments. This gets selected because the frame for mural advertise-
ments shares with the target domain (Jump’s life) some generic-
level information: an entity existing longer than expected. In
other words, the physical context (mural advertisements on the
walls of old New York City buildings) furnishes a potential tar-
get domain with an appropriate source domain. This is another
way in which the physical context can prime the selection of a
particular source domain that fits a particular target.
A poetic example
Context can be used in poetry in two ways:
Poets may describe the context in which they create poetry.
(literal use)
They may use context as a means of talking about something
else. (figurative use)
When the first is the case, we get straightforward examples of
describing a scene, such as in Matthew Arnold’s Dover Beach:
“The sea is calm to-night.
The tide is full, the moon lies fair
Upon the straits,- on the French coast, the light
Gleams and is gone; the cliffs of England stand,
Glimmering and vast, out in the tranquil bay.
Come to the window, sweet is the night-air!”
(retrieved from http://www.artofeurope.com/arnold/arn1.htm)
[14].
This is a largely literal description of the physical context,
more precisely, what the author can see around him. But my
concern will be with the second use of context, or scene.
Let us now continue with the Arnold poem:
“The sea of Faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth’s shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.”
At work in this stanza are two conceptual metaphors: health
is wholeness and perfection/completeness is roundness, as in-
dicated by the expressions “at the full” (wholeness) and “and
round earth’s shore” (roundness). The stanza, we understand, is
about the health and perfection of the human condition until the
coming of the changes that were happening at the time of writ-
ing the poem: the changes to the established order of the world
in which religion played a major role. These two extremely gen-
eral metaphors can be instantiated (and could be instantiated by
Arnold) in many different ways; the wholeness and roundness
of a diverse set of other things could be utilized. The question
arises why they are made conceptually-linguistically manifest
in the particular way they are; that is, by the metaphor “the sea
of Faith” in the first line of the stanza. This metaphor assumes
the conceptual metaphors (Christian) faith is the sea and peo-
ple are the land. The sea was once full and covered the land
all around, and in the same way Christian faith provided people
with a spiritual health (health is wholeness) and a perfect state of
the human condition (perfection is roundness), unlike the situa-
tion in which Arnold wrote the poem. In addition, the full cover
of faith protected people from the dangers of the new times that
now threaten a faithless world. These ideas were given expres-
sion in these particular ways, we can safely assume, because of
what Arnold saw before him at the time of creating the poem:
the ebb and flow of the sea. As the sea retreats, that is, as faith
disappears, the world becomes a less healthy and less perfect
place, unprotected by faith.
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This is a more complex situation than the previous ones. The
reason is that (1) the author has a particular idea (the human con-
dition was good/perfect when there was faith, and faith protected
people; but now dangers threaten a faithless world, and the hu-
man condition is not good/perfect); (2) crucial aspects of the
idea are conceptualized conventionally: health is wholeness and
perfection is roundness; (3) the conventional metaphors consti-
tuting crucial aspects of the idea need to be expressed in spe-
cific ways because the conventional metaphors are generic-level
ones that do not entail the dangers with which the new situation
threatens; (4) in order to recognize the danger of the situation
for human beings, there must be a clear indication that it is hu-
man beings who are threatened by the lack of faith. This is ac-
complished by the two relatively novel conceptual metaphors:
(Christian) faith is the sea and, especially, people are the land;
(5) finally, the resulting two metaphors are allowed to interact
with each other within the framework and confines of the previ-
ously mentioned metaphors (health is wholeness and perfection
is roundness). This means that the “wholeness” and “round-
ness” of the sea around the earth indicates the healthiness and
perfection of the human condition, whereas their lack indicates
danger.
Conclusions
In the paper, I raised the issue of the role of visual images
in metaphorical conceptualization. I noted that, in addition to
visual aspects of many metaphorical source domains, there are
visual images in the online physical context of metaphorical
conceptualization that can serve as source domains of novel
metaphors. I suggested that we can think of such cases as the
visual images priming the selection of metaphorical source do-
mains.
I argued, furthermore, that the visual metaphors created this
way work on several levels of complexity. In the everyday ex-
ample, the visual image (capsized boats in the sea) simply trig-
gered the use of a conventional source domain (sea journey) that
is compatible with that visual image. In the example related to
counseling, a visual image prompts the selection of a source do-
main based on highly skeletal structural similarity between the
source and the target (but see also [2] ). Finally, in the exam-
ple of poetic metaphor, a number of conventional and uncon-
ventional metaphors interact with each other and the ideas to be
expressed by the speaker/conceptualizer. This example presents
a cognitively complex situation, and it indicates that visual im-
ages are involved in the creation of metaphors in a variety of
ways, ranging from simply priming source domains to priming
a complex set of conceptual interactions that yield a complex
source domain.
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